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Following electricity sector reforms in the late 1990s, prices charged by 
government-owned distributors in the south and eastern states of Australia 
more than doubled and the productivity of these government distributors 
declined. Econometric analysis associates much higher regulated revenues 
and regulated asset values with government-owned than investor-owned 
distributors. This disparity is not observed in other countries. Various 
commonly repeated explanations for higher distributor spending (stricter 
network planning standards, flawed regulatory rules, flawed appeal 
mechanisms, catch-up for historic underspending) do not seem to explain the 
disparity. This analysis suggests that owning governments perceive their cost 
of capital to be lower than that of their regulated private peers. The perceived 
premium encouraged government distributors to expand their asset base, and 
hence their prices and profits. The private-interest theory of regulation 
provides a plausible explanation for this.  
 
 
Keywords: electricity distribution, independent regulation, ownership and 
regulation, regulatory capture 
 






From the late 1990s, the electricity industry in the south and eastern states of 
Australia was restructured to separate those activities that could be opened to 
competition (the production and sale of electricity) from the transmission and 
distribution of electricity by network monopolies. State and later quasi-national 
regulators determined the monopolies' prices and revenues.  
 
The Industry Commission's report (1991) justified reform on the basis that it 
would improve the distributors’ capital productivity and that although electricity 
prices were then low by world standards, industry restructuring (including 
independent regulation of government monopolies) meant they were expected 
to become even lower.  However, having once had amongst the lowest prices 
amongst member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), household electricity prices in Australia are now 
amongst the highest. While several factors have contributed to this, increases 
in network charges are the main reason (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 2018).  
 
There is a disparity in the outcomes delivered by government and private 
distributors. Having started from a similar position in respect of prices and 
asset values at the time of the reform, over the course of successive 
regulatory controls, the regulated asset value and hence prices of the 
government distributors grew more quickly than those of the privatised 
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distributors. The disparity now evident between government-owned and 
investor-owned distributors in Australia is not evident in other countries.1).  
 
This article responds to the questions raised in Mountain and Littlechild 
(2010), which found the costs and revenues of the government distributors in 
New South Wales (NSW) to be higher and increasing faster than the private 
distributors in Victoria or Great Britain. It suggested that regulatory framework 
and conduct and, in particular, the difference in ownership and its impact on 
regulation, appeared to be a large part of the explanation for the 
government/private disparity. That paper suggested further and more rigorous 
examination.   
                                                     
1  For example, in New Zealand (Growitsch, Jamasb, and Wetzel 2012, 
Talosaga and Howell 2012, Nillesen and Pollitt 2011, Fillipini and Wetzel 
2014) do not find a statistically significant difference in the prices charged by 
investor-owned and customer-owned distributors. In the United States, Kwoka 
(2005a, b) finds an immaterial difference in prices comparing investor-owned 
and non-investor owned (typically municipal or rural co-operative) distributors. 
More generally in the United States, a long tradition of comparison of public 
and private electricity utilities  (see Stigler and Friedland, 1962; Peltzman, 
1971; De Alessi, 1974; Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1986); Peters (1993) does 






This analysis seeks to provide a wider and more rigorous analysis of cost and 
price differentials, relating particularly to ownership. It examines more 
thoroughly other possible explanations and, among other things, includes 
more recent information and subsequent experience.   
 
The study aims to contribute to the literature in two areas. First, a large and 
heterogeneous data panel of electricity distributors in five countries is 
developed and a mixed fixed-effects/random-effects model is used to 
establish a statistically significant association between ownership and the 
regulated asset values and prices charged by the Australian distributors, 
distinguishing those that are government owned from those that are privately 
owned. Second, the article contributes an empirical study relevant to the 
literature on the theories of regulation by evaluating the plausibility of 
explanations suggested by the public-interest and private-interest theories of 
regulation, in the case, not explicitly contemplated by the theories, that 
government owns the regulated entity.  
 
The next section reviews the relevant literature. The third section provides 
context to the industry and its institutions. The fourth section presents analysis 
to establish a statistically significant association between Australian distributor 
ownership and their regulated asset values and prices. The fifth section 
critically examines explanations provided by governments, regulators and the 
industry for the outcomes examined in this article. This leads to discussion, 
conclusions, and policy implications. An appendix provides a quantitative 
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comparison of the outcomes delivered by the government-owned and 
privately-owned distributors. 
 
2. Relevant literature  
 
The theories of regulation and also finance theory with respect to the cost of 
capital to utilities are relevant to this study. Each is examined in turn. 
 
Theories of regulation 
The literature distinguishes two main theories of regulation: the public-interest 
theory of regulation and the private-interest theory of regulation (Crew and 
Kleindorfer, 2002; Den Hertog, 2010; Posner, 1974; Zerbe and Mc Curdy, 
2000; Levine and Forrence, 1990; Priest, 1993; Laffont and Tirole, 1991). It is 
these two theories that we focus on.  
 
The public-interest theory of regulation is a "normative" theory of regulation 
(Ricketts 2006, p. 35; Newbery 2000, p. 136; Baldwin & Cave 1999, p. 10; 
Laffont & Tirole 1993, p. 19). Laffont and Tirole (1991) suggest that almost all 
of the theoretical work on the regulation of natural monopolies has embraced 
the public-interest paradigm. However, there are differing perspectives on 
what the theory holds. Posner (1974) describes the theory as more often 
assumed than articulated. As Hantke-Domas (2003, 166) suggests, “no 
author has claimed intellectual ascendancy over the public-interest 
theory…the public-interest theory does not have any known origin”. Den 
Hertog (2010) suggests that the mainstream economic literature is implicitly or 
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explicitly critical of the public interest theories of regulation and Priest (1993) 
suggests few scholars purport to defend public interest explanations of 
regulation.  Scholars describe the theory in vague and philosophical terms. 
For example, Levine and Forrence (1990, 167) say the theory posits "political 
actors who act, sometimes perhaps mistakenly, to further a vision of the 
public good". Ricketts (2006, 37) describes the public-interest theory as 
consistent with “… regulators in the public interest tradition as acting as 
philosopher kings in an economy understood as a set of equations and in 
which the technical task is simply to control the values of a set of policy 
instruments so as bring about the best result”. 
 
In this analysis, I draw on the thrust of the public-interest theory, as a 
normative theory, in prescribing what regulators should do. By implication 
under the normative theory of regulation, regulators are assumed always to 
be seeking to act in the public interest, and so outcomes that do not serve the 
public interest are attributed to well-intended but unanticipated flaws in 
regulatory design or conduct. Joskow and Noll (1981, 36) suggest that as a 
positive theory of regulation, that is a theory to describe what actually occurs, 
the public-interest theory is obviously incorrect. They attribute this to two main 
factors: first, individuals have objectives that are affected by the actions of 
regulatory institutions, but are not yet accounted for in applied welfare 
economics; and second, political agents are economic actors, as are 
producers and consumers, and they respond to incentives created by political 
institutions and administrative processes. Hence, a rational regulator would be 
unlikely to seek to maximise conventional measures of economic welfare.  
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The economic theory of regulation is also referred to as the "private-interest 
theory" (Den Hertog, 2010), “the Chicago version of the modern development 
of public choice theory” (Tollison, 1989, 295), the “Chicago theory of 
government” (Noll, 1989, 48) or the “interest group theory of government” 
(Leight, 2012, 230).  The economic theory of regulation, as an element of 
broader public choice theory, is often described as a positive theory of 
regulation. Whereas the public-interest theory does not have any known origin 
(Hantke-Domas, 2003), Leight, (2012, 214) suggests that public-choice theory 
has emerged as a "coherent, self-conscious intellectual movement with a 
significant complement of intellectual historians who chronicle its origins and 
growth". Peltzman (1989) suggests the most important element of the 
economic theory of regulation is its integration of the analysis of political 
behavior with the larger body of economic analysis. Politicians, like the rest of 
us, are presumed to be self-interested maximisers. This means that interest 
groups can influence the outcome of the regulatory process by providing 
financial or other support to politicians or regulators.   (Leight ,2012, 
Peltzman, 1989, 1993, Posner, 1974) and others point to Stigler (1971) as the 
foundational article on the economic theory of regulation. Stigler provided a 
theoretical rationale for the capture of regulatory agencies by producer 
interests. By implication, the private-interest economic theory of regulation 
predicts the failure of regulation to serve the public interest as attributable to 
its capture by producer interests.  
 
It is relevant to this study that the development of both the public-interest and 
private-interest theories of regulation have implicitly considered regulation as 
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a phenomenon that applies to privately owned entities. This study examines 
the somewhat unusual situation in which regulation has been applied to 
government-owned entities on the assumption, strictly applied, that they are 
privately owned.  
 
Finance theory 
A feature of the institutional arrangements in Australia is that after the 
reforms, the government-owned distributors have been regulated as if they 
were privately financed. Perhaps it was expected that the government 
distributors would respond to profit maximisation incentives in the same way 
as their investor-owned peers. While regulation of government-owned 
businesses by an entity distinct from the government is not unknown in other 
countries, in Australia an ownership-invariant approach has been rigorously 
applied in the design and conduct of regulation.  
 
Finance theory (for example, Baumol et al., 1983; Evans, 1998; or Hathaway, 
1997) suggests that the cost of capital should be invariant to ownership. 
Specifically, it advises that the appropriate estimate of the cost of a 
government’s capital is a private owner's pre-tax cost of capital. While not 
contesting this advice on how governments should value their capital, in 
practice this does not seem to be how they have valued their capital; I 
suggest that this is the at the root of the explanation for the government-
private distributor disparity. 
 
 
3. Network regulation in Australia 
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This section presents background on the industry, describes its institutions 
and summarises the relevant outcomes. For the sake of brevity, the reference 
to “Australia” here refers to electricity distribution within the boundary of what 
is now known as the National Electricity Market (NEM) that encompasses the 
south and eastern states and territories of South Australia, Tasmania, 
Victoria, NSW, Queensland, and the Australian Capital Territory. Appendix A 
presents data on the outcomes (allowed expenditure, investment, and profits) 
of the Australian distributors over the study period. 
 
3.1   Industry  
 
Distributors transport electricity from high voltage substations to customers’ 
meters, and increasingly from distributed power sources behind the meter to 
other customers. In Australia distribution account for around 80% of the total 
regulated asset value of networks, with the higher voltage transmission 
companies accounting for the remaining 20%.  
 
From the late 1980s, the distribution sector was rationalised. In New South 
Wales 25 local government distributors were merged into four and finally 
three. In Queensland (QLD) seven were merged into three and then two. In 
Victoria (VIC) 11 municipal and one regional distributor were merged to form 
five distributors. Electricity retailing was unbundled from distribution starting in 
VIC and then SA. Other than in Tasmania (TAS) and in one part of QLD 
(where retailing is legally separated from distribution) retailers are completely 
separate from distributors.  
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There are now 13 distributors in the NEM, of which the five in Victoria were 
privatised in 1994 and the single distributor in South Australia in 2000. In 
other jurisdictions, until 2016 all distributors remained government owned. 
Two of the three in NSW have since been partially (51%) privatised. The 
distributor in the Australian Capital Territory is significantly smaller than the 
other distributors and so has not been included here.  The remaining 12 
distributors vary considerably. One of the three government-owned 
distributors in NSW (Essential Energy), one of the Queensland distributors 
(Ergon), two of the investor-owned distributors in Victoria (Powercor and 
Ausnet Services) and the investor-owned South Australian distributor (SA 
Power Networks) and the Tasmanian distributor serve a combination of cities, 
small towns, villages and sparsely populated rural areas. The remaining five 
distributors (of which two are government-owned and three are investor-
owned) serve mainly populated metropolitan areas that are relatively dense.    
 
3.2  Institutions  
 
Electricity supply is a constitutional right of the jurisdictions (states and 
territories). After the industry was vertically separated and the distributors 
merged, state regulatory commissions oversaw the distributors in their states. 
Since 2004, pursuant to centralisation policies, quasi-federal institutions were 
created. Four institutions are now relevant to economic regulation: the Council 
of Australian Government’s (COAG) Energy Council, the Australian Energy 
Markets Commission (AEMC), the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) and the 
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Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT). A fifth entity, the Energy Security 
Board has recently been created.  
 
The COAG Energy Council represents state and territory energy ministers 
and is chaired by the Commonwealth Energy Minister. The Council provides 
policy leadership and is also responsible for the oversight of the AEMC, in 
some respects the AER, Australian Energy Market Operator and Energy 
Consumers Australia.  
 
The AEMC was established by COAG. It is the statutory rule-maker and 
advisor to the COAG Energy Council. Its five members are appointed by 
COAG. The AEMC established and maintains the National Electricity Rules 
("Rules"). The main features of regulation are specified in Rules: the duration 
of the regulatory control period; allowable methods for the calculation of the 
regulated cost of capital; the valuation and indexation of the regulatory asset 
base; depreciation methods; allowances for income taxes; arrangements for 
intra-period cost pass-throughs; and the regulatory process. 
 
The AER is a three-person Commission funded by the Commonwealth 
Government who appoints one commissioner, with another appointed by state 
governments and whose Chair is jointly appointed by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the states.  
 
The AER implements the regulations established in the Rules. This entails 
setting quinquennial revenue or price controls that establish allowances for 
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operating expenditure, depreciation, a post-tax return on assets and expected 
income tax. The details of the AER’s approach are described in nine 
guidelines. Another 13 documents explain the guidelines. The predecessor 
regulators to the AER, the state-based essential services commissions, 
applied a similar periodic regulatory review approach.  
 
AER decisions were (until October 2017) subject to merits review by the 
Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT). Appeals to the ACT on some aspect of 
the AER’s determinations were usual.  
 
A particularly significant feature of the institutional arrangements is the idea 
that regulation should be applied in a way that does not discriminate on the 
basis of the ownership of the regulated entity. Specifically, this has meant that 
government distributors are assumed to be privately financed and they are 
awarded a cost of capital based on the pre-tax cost of capital of their investor-
owned peers. The ownership invariant approach is prescribed in the Rules 
and follows the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) signed the state and 
territory and Australian governments in 1994.  While the CPA was intended to 
apply to government-owned businesses that sell in contestable markets, all 
the state governments chose also to apply it to the network monopolies they 
owned.  
 
Australia’s regulators have defended the approach of awarding government 
distributions a pre-tax cost of capital. For example, in 2011 a group of major 
Australian energy users petitioned the AEMC to change the Rules so that the 
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regulator’s allowance for borrowing costs charged to energy users (for 
government-owned distributors) should more closely reflect their owning 
governments’ actual borrowing costs (rather than the estimated private 
borrowing rates of BBB-rated debt). The AEMC rejected the application (see 
Australian Energy Markets Commission, 2012), on the basis that to have 
regard to the government's actual borrowing costs would underestimate the 
distributor's actual cost of capital and hence misallocate resources.  In its 
rejection of the energy users’ petition, the AEMC also argued that the 
governments’ receipt of the income tax on their distributors’ profits would not 
distort their investment decisions since the income tax was received by a 
different branch of the Government than that of their distributors’ shareholding 
ministers.  
 
The AER and state governments that owned their distributors supported the 
AEMC’s rejection. By contrast, in line with the arguments in (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993), the Productivity Commission, an independent advisor to the 
Commonwealth Government, recognised that distortions arose by awarding 
government distributors private funding rates. While it continued to support an 
approach that allowed government distributors to charge customers private 
financing costs, it did nonetheless suggest that further thought be given to an 
adjustment to returns to account for the fact that state governments would not 
collect income tax on the distributors within their jurisdiction if those 
distributors were privately owned (see Productivity Commission, 2013). 
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The distributors in Victoria and South Australia were privatised in the mid-
1990s (Victoria) and 2001 (South Australia). The rest have remained 
government owned until 2016 when NSW sold a 51% share in two of its three 
distributors to private investors. In all cases, the government-owned 
distributors were corporatised and became liable for income tax on their 
profits which the owning state governments (rather than the Commonwealth) 
collected pursuant to constitutional constraints on Commonwealth from taxing 
state government-owned entities.  
 
4. Econometric analysis 
 
While government distributors spent more and grew their assets more quickly 
than private distributors it is possible that factors such as technology selection 
(underground cable versus overhead line), network density or distributor size 
might explain the disparity. To assess this, an econometric study sought to 
determine whether ownership could explain the regulated revenues and 
regulated assets of government-owned and private distributors in Australia. In 
this analysis, I established a data panel that included distributors in Norway, 
New Zealand, Great Britain, and Ontario, covering a wide range of different 
distributors that varied as to size, customer numbers, the proportion of 
network above or below ground, peak demands and energy supplied. The 
data panel covered 225 distributors over the period from 2002 to 2013.  The 
Norwegian distributors are (local) government owned, all but one of the 
Ontario distributors is (local) government owned, the British distributors are all 
privately owned and around half the New Zealand distributors are owned by 
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customers (through trusts in which customers are beneficial owners), with the 
other half owned by investors.  
 
Two models with regulated revenues and regulated asset values as the 
dependent variables were selected. These were chosen since these are the 
two key variables that the regulators determine. Regulated annual revenue is 
the sum of the regulators' determination of allowances for operating 
expenditure, depreciation of the capital stock, the cost of finance and 
expected income tax. The regulated asset value is the regulators' assessment 
of the value of the capital stock. Country dummy variables control for different 
approaches to asset valuation (depreciated replacement cost versus 
depreciated historic cost), depreciation and other unknown factors that could 
explain country-level differences amongst the distributors.  
 
In the regressions, the selection of possible independent variables included 
customer numbers, the volume of electricity distributed, peak demands, 
customer type, reliability standards, network length, network design and 
technology selection, typology, geology, climate, environmental and planning 
restrictions2. Drawing on Neuberg (1977) and considering the approaches 
adopted in the efficiency measurement and economies of scale literature (see 
in particular, Economic Insights, 2014; Nillesen and Pollitt 2011; Burns and 
Weyman-Jones, 1996; Kuosmanen, Saastamoinen, and Sipiläinen, 2013; 
Edvardsen and Førsund, 2003; Kwoka 2005a, 2005b; Kinnunen, 2005; Farsi 
                                                     




and Filippini, 2009; Giles and Wyatt, 1993; Salvanes and Tjotta, 1998; and 
Yatchew, 2000), and considering the available data, the potential dependent 
variables was narrowed down to the number of customers served numbers, 
network throughput (energy delivered), peak demand, network length, and 
proportion of the distribution grid that is underground.   
 
Analysis of the correlation between these potential variables, analysis of their 
correlation with the dependent variables, and observations from the literature 
suggested the selection of customer numbers and network density.  
In the selection of the functional form of the regression both Cobb-Douglas 
and Translog functional forms were considered and following (Nillesen and 
Pollitt 2011), the Cobb-Douglas model was preferred. For completeness, a 
Translog model was also estimated. Both models are common in the 
literature. Equations 1 and 2 specify the regressions.  
 




+  +  +  







where  are the regression coefficients, i denotes the distributor and t denotes 
the year, the error term  with individual effects  and the remainder random 
disturbances  following a stationary autoregressive order one process i.e. = + 
with . 
 
A fixed effects estimation to reduce omitted variable bias was preferred but 
rejected because the time-invariant country dummy variables would be 
eliminated in a fixed-effects estimation. Instead, a random-effects model with 
the inclusion of Mundlak Means following Mundlak (1978) was chosen. This 
allowed the relaxation of the assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity of 
the distributors is uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables. A 
model that includes Mundlak Means might be described as a mixed fixed-
effects/random-effects model, where the effects are allowed to be correlated 
with the time-varying regressors but are uncorrelated with the time-invariant 
regressors. 
 
Considering the calculation of regulated assets and regulated revenues 
autocorrelation in the error term was expected and confirmed in Wooldridge-
Drucker tests (Wooldridge 2002). The chosen estimator to take account of this 
first order autocorrelation, is a generalised least-squares estimator for random 
effects, following (Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendranathan, 1982; Baltagi and 
Wu, 1999; and (Wooldridge 2002). 
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Tests for interactions between the dummy variables and the preferred 
explanatory and output characteristic variables confirmed that the dummy 
variables are not interacting with the other (continuous) explanatory variables, 
and hence dummy variable interaction terms are excluded from the preferred 
models 
 
Table 1 presents the revenue estimation including the statistically significant 
Mundlak Means (denoted as the variable name plus “mm” at the end of the 
name).  Tests showed that the value of the coefficients on the Australian 
dummies (and their statistical significance) is not meaningfully affected by the 
inclusion of all Mundlak Means rather than just the statistically significant 
Mundlak Means.  
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Table 1. Revenue estimation with statistically significant (p<0.05) Mundlak 
Means included 
Customer	numbers	> 200,000													 	 100,000												 	 25,000														 	 -																				 	
Year 2004-2013 2004-2013 2004-2013 2004-2013
VARIABLES LnRevenue LnRevenue LnRevenue LnRevenue
LnCustNum 2.082*** 1.029*** 1.008*** 1.070***
(1.529	-	2.636) (0.943	-	1.115) (0.967	-	1.049) (0.971	-	1.170)
LnDensity -0.194*** -0.205*** -0.255*** -0.197***





AusGovernment 0.546*** 0.311*** 0.253*** 0.435***
(0.160	-	0.933) (0.0771	-	0.546) (0.0675	-	0.439) (0.242	-	0.627)
AusPrivate 0.256 0.0473 0.00955 0.188**
(-0.114	-	0.626) (-0.156	-	0.250) (-0.158	-	0.177) (0.00932	-	0.368)
NZIOU -0.231 -0.192* -0.261*** -0.335***
(-0.691	-	0.228) (-0.400	-	0.0168) (-0.440	-	-0.0822) (-0.478	-	-0.192)
NZCustomer - - -0.426*** -0.551***
(-0.559	-	-0.294) (-0.656	-	-0.447)
GB 0.398** 0.138* 0.0530 0.0381
(0.0295	-	0.767) (-0.0247	-	0.301) (-0.0336	-	0.140) (-0.0450	-	0.121)
Ontario -0.356* -0.623*** -0.616*** -0.290***
(-0.736	-	0.0241) (-0.874	-	-0.372) (-0.788	-	-0.444) (-0.446	-	-0.134)
o.Norway - - - -
Constant 0.417 -0.137 0.342 1.682***
(-1.326	-	2.160) (-1.214	-	0.941) (-0.133	-	0.817) (1.485	-	1.878)
Observations 320 423 825 2,079
Number	of	DNO 34 47 96 225
R2-Overall 0.891 0.952 0.982 0.986
R2-Within 0.309 0.203 0.265 0.288
R2-Between 0.930 0.973 0.989 0.987
Var	explained	by	ui 0.657 0.587 0.567 0.711






The columns in the table present the model results for the specified number of 
distributors in the panel (the first row shows the criterion for the number of 
customers to determine which distributors are included). The coefficient on 
the dummy variable for government distributors in Australia 
(“AusGovernment”) is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01 in all cases 
except for the dataset of distributors with greater than 25,000 customers in 
which case significance is p<0.05). By comparison, the coefficient on private 
distributors (“AusPrivate”) is not significant except for the dataset that includes 
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all distributors. For New Zealand, the coefficients for investor-owned 
distributors (“NZIOU”) and customer-owned distributors (“NZCustomer") are 
negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). Comparing the coefficients on 
these two dummies, it is clear that customer-owned distributors are 
associated with lower regulated revenues than the investor-owned 
distributors. 
 
Sensitivity to the selection of different time periods ranging from 2002-2013 to 
2006-2013 found that the value of the coefficients and the statistical 
significance of the main variables is barely changed. Table 2 shows the 
results for the estimation of regulated asset value. In this case both 
government and private dummies for the Australian distributors are 
statistically significant.  
 
 
Table 2. Regulated asset value estimation with statistically significant (p<0.05) 
Mundlak Means included 
  
 
Since the model regresses against the natural log of regulated asset values, 
the difference in the exponent of these variables expresses the relative impact 
of ownership on regulated revenues. By calculation, government ownership is 
associated with regulated asset values that are 46% higher for the model of 
distributors with more than 25,000 customers, rising to a maximum of 57% for 
the model of distributors with more than 200,000 customers. As for the 
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revenue regressions, testing showed that these results are robust to time 
period and the inclusion of all Mundlak Means. 
 
Estimation using Translog rather than Cobb-Douglas cost functions produced 
similar results as to the magnitude and statistical significance of the Australian 
dummy variables.  I also tested sensitivity to the selection of different 
explanatory variables including the combination of customer numbers and 
share of underground cable and found the conclusions are robust to this. In all 
models, Wald (Chi Square) tests rejected the null hypothesis (p<0.01) that the 
coefficient on the investor-owned and non-investor owned distributor dummy 
variables in Australia was the same. 
 
In summary, the main finding of this study is that in Australia, government 
ownership of distributors is a statistically significant (p<0.01) explanation of 
regulated revenues and regulated assets in almost all cases. Comparing the 
central estimate of the coefficient on the Australian government dummy 
versus the Australian private dummy variable shows that for the preferred 
model, government ownership in Australia is associated with regulated 
revenues that are 26% higher and regulated assets that are 46% higher 
leaving all other factors the same. This finding is not meaningfully affected by 
the size of the distributors included in the models or the time periods for the 
study. It is also not affected by the model selection (Translog rather than 
Cobb-Douglas models) or the inclusion or exclusion of statistically insignificant 




As with all models, it is possible that unspecified environmental factors and 
policy objectives might explain the difference between government and 
private distributors; however a review of their public statements and 
submissions finds that neither the government distributors, nor their owning 
governments, nor the regulators have suggested that such factors exist.   
 
 
5. Possible explanations 
 
Distributors, regulators, government departments and industry associations 
attributed distributors’ higher spending and consequential increases in 
regulated revenues and asset values to various factors. These included rising 
peak demand, a need to catch-up for previous under-investment, a changing 
investment environment, flawed regulatory rules, excessively strict network 
planning standards and flaws in the arrangements for the review of the merits 
of the regulator’s decisions. Can these explain relatively higher expenditure by 
the government than private distributors?  
 
Higher expected demands 
 
Expectations of higher peak demand (and consequently network 
augmentation to meet those higher demands) were typically a major factor in 
distributors’ proposed regulated revenue claims. Review of the distributors’ 
proposals finds that the government distributors forecast higher demand 
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growth and more expenditure to meet the forecast higher demand than the 
private distributors. The distributors’ demand projections were typically 
accepted without variation by the state regulators and then the AER. In the 
event, peak demand grew more slowly than expected and for all distributors 
has declined since 2009 per connection and for most distributors also in 
absolute terms. In this sense demand forecast error is an explanation. 
However, the error was asymmetric: the government distributors consistently 
forecast higher demand growth rates than private distributors. 
 
Historic expenditure catch-up 
 
With respect to the claim that spending was justified to catch up for previous 
under-spending, government and industry association reports that preceded 
the industry reform (see London Economics Limited, 1993; 1994, 1994b; and 
Pierce, Price, and Rose, 1995) pointed to excess capital in electricity 
distribution as a justification, in part, for industry reform.  Topp and Kulys 
(2012) show a slight improvement in Total Factor Productivity in the decade 
before the reforms took effect and that this was approximately comparable in 
all states. Yet in their regulatory proposals after the reforms, the government 
distributors proposed, and the regulators largely accepted, higher spending on 
the basis of the need to “catch up” for historic underspending. While it might 
be plausible to suggest that lower capital expenditure in the decade before the 
reforms took effect might be expected to be followed by higher expenditure to 
catch up, the historic spending pattern does not support the argument for 
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relatively higher “catch up” expenditure for the government-owned relative to 
the investor-owned distributors.  
 
Changes in the investment environment 
 
The AER suggested that changes in the environment for investment helped to 
explain why “consumers are paying more than they should to maintain a 
reliable and secure power system” (Australian Energy Regulator 2011, 4) For 
example in the pre-reform era the emphasis in influential inquiries - see 
(Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell 1993) and (Industry Commission 1991) - was 
on raising the productivity of the economy through greater efficiency and in 
the case of the electricity industry, by raising capital productivity. This priority 
seemed to change after the reforms took effect.  For example, the Productivity 
Commission suggested that regulators should err in favour of too much rather 
than too little expenditure by the regulated networks (Productivity Commission 
2001). Not long after, a ministerial report (see Ministerial Council on Energy, 
2003) which presaged the creation of the AER and AEMC, justified two 
separate agencies rather than one contrary to the advice they had received 
(see Parer et al., 2002), on the basis that this would improve the climate for 
investment and enhance regulatory certainty. It seems reasonable to suggest 
that changes in the investment environment had affected regulators’ 
willingness to allow greater capital expenditure but again this cannot explain 






In the course of the development of the first Rules that the newly created AER 
was required to implement from 2009, the AEMC said that the Rules would 
“improve the environment for investment by increasing regulatory clarity and 
certainty…” (Australian Energy Markets Commission 2006).  At the time, the 
AER argued against these rules on the basis that they would undermine their 
ability to determine efficient expenditure allowances. After its first decisions 
under those Rules, in 2011 the AER proposed that they be changed on the 
basis that they had “inappropriately favour(ed) network service providers” 
(Australian Energy Regulator 2011, 4).  In response, the AEMC changed 
aspects of the rules although the AEMC also pointed to the importance of the 
AER’s effectiveness in applying the Rules and to the “corporate governance” 
of the distributors (Australian Energy Markets Commission 2012b, 7). While 
the contribution of perceived or actual flaws in the Rules in explaining higher 
expenditure is arguable, these flaws cannot explain the disparity between 
government and private distributor spending.  
 
Network planning standards 
 
With regard to excessively strict planning standards, state governments in 
NSW and Queensland tightened their distribution network planning standards 
in 2005. This explains some part of the higher expenditure that their 
distributors proposed and that the state regulators and then later the AER 
approved. In 2012, the governments of NSW and Queensland relaxed the 
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planning standards again. Higher expenditure followed stricter planning 
standards but the rationale for those stricter standards is not clear.  Although 
governments justified the higher standards on the need to improve quality of 
supply, data on the frequency and duration of network outages do not support 
the contention that the networks' quality of supply was inadequate. Indeed, 
the quality of supply was not meaningfully different after the higher 




With regard to the appeal of regulatory decisions to the Australian 
Competition Tribunal (ACT), both government and private distributors have 
applied to the ACT to review aspects of AER determinations. The ACT, which 
had typically accepted the distributors’ applications, has had a significant 
impact on regulated revenues of all distributors, not just the government 




All of these factors appear to have inappropriately favoured the distribution 
industry as a whole, and thus may help explain why network capital 
expenditure increased after the industry’s reform. But none of these seem to 





This analysis finds that government ownership of distributors is associated 
with regulated assets and regulated revenues that are 46% and 26% 
respectively, higher than privately owned distributors in Australia. Network 
characteristics, size, and density cannot explain the difference in the 
regulated revenues or regulated assets of the government and private 
distributors. Similarly, explanations provided by the industry, regulators, and 
governments, while somewhat helpful in contributing to the context, do not 
seem to explain the disparity.   
 
My working hypothesis is that the owning governments perceived their actual 
cost of capital to be well below the level that the regulators had determined in 
setting allowed returns. This encouraged government owners to encourage 
their managers to expand their regulated asset bases in order to increase 
financial returns.  
 
The gap between allowed rates of return and actual financing costs can be 
seen for example in the allowances for debt funding. In the period from 2009 
to 2014, for example, the AER determined a cost of debt to be recovered in 
regulated charges that exceeded the actual cost of debt for the three 
distributors in NSW as reported in their financial statements, by between 280 
and 430 basis points (the range being attributable to different distributors for 
different years in this period). Over the five-year regulatory control period, this 
difference meant that the distributors received $2.5 billion more revenue than 
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needed to recover their actual borrowing costs.  In addition, over the same 
period from 2009 to 2014, the NSW Government collected $2.7bn in taxes on 
the profits of its distributors and from fees on its loans to its distributors. The 
State Government would have not received the income taxes if the industry 
was privately owned (since the taxes would then have been paid to the 
Commonwealth Government).  
 
Through the allowances for borrowing costs and incomes taxes, over the five 
years from 2009 to 2014, the NSW government distributors therefore 
collected $5.2bn more than they would have if the regulator set debt 
allowances based on their actual costs and not allowed them to recover 
income taxes that they would not have collected if the industry was privately 
owned. The same picture is evident for the government-owned distributors in 
Tasmania and Queensland. 
 
The state budgets show the importance of state government funding of its 
distributors. The 2012-13 NSW budget showed total liabilities in June 2013 of 
$88 billion, of which borrowings comprised $30 billion. The annual financial 
reports of the three NSW distributors showed aggregate borrowing (from the 
NSW State Treasury) of $16.15 billion. In other words, the distributors’ 
borrowing in the 2013 financial year accounted for more than half of all NSW 
Government borrowing.  In the same year, total Queensland Government 
borrowing was $42.2 billion, of which the electricity distributors accounted for 
$11 billion. In that year, the largest item of capital spending in the Queensland 
Government’s budget, after spending on roads by the Department of 
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Transport and Main Roads, was for capital spending by its electricity 
distributors.  
 
In addition to the incentive to expand the asset base to increase profits, 
following Mountain and Littlechild (2010), I suggest the gap between the 
allowed and perceived cost of capital also encouraged owning governments 
to limit the extent of regulatory power in order to protect those profits.  This is 
evident, for example, in the following: 
 
(a) the bifurcation of regulation between two agencies rather than one which, 
as noted, was justified by state ministers on the basis that this would promote 
higher spending;  
(b) the NSW and Queensland governments’ tightening of network planning 
standards (a decision they did not allow regulators to make), which resulted in 
higher expenditures by the distributors they owned, but in the absence of a 
plausible quality of supply problem; 
(c) transitional arrangements (when the regulation of distributors was 
transferred to the AER) that set a higher cost of equity than the AER had 
determined for other distributors.  
 
My hypothesis leans heavily on the assumption that owning governments 
perceived the gap in financing allowances and responded to it as they might 
be expected to. Further research would be valuable to understand whether 
owning governments anticipated this at the time of the reform, or whether 
after having discovered how profitable distribution could be, they were 
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motivated to defend the arrangements. While financial returns might be 
expected to be of great interest to owning governments, it would be valuable 
also to explore the extent to which other possible objectives, such as 
employment and a desire to improve the quality of service, can contribute to 
the explanation of the disparity. Further, it would be worthwhile to investigate 
to what extent can outcomes be attributed to the explicit constraints that the 
governments placed on the regulatory bodies in comparison to the tacit regard 
for government thinking that may have influenced what the actions of the 
regulators (and the government distributors). 
 
Finally, which of the two main theories of regulation provide a more plausible 
explanation of these outcomes? The public-interest theory would explain the 
outcomes as attributable to well-intentioned institutions that, with the benefit of 
hindsight, are seen to have made mistakes. In this case, it would suggest that 
apparent flaws in appeal mechanisms, poorly designed regulatory rules, 
demand forecast errors and excessively strict network planning standards 
resulted in what turned out to be unexpectedly higher expenditure and profits. 
But this does not explain why those mistakes were so much bigger for 
government than private distributors.  To the extent that public-interest 
theorists argue that governments respond to regulatory incentives in the same 
way as private owners would, then the observed outcomes must be attributed 
to owning governments having failed to understand that finance theory 
suggests their cost of capital is the same as a private owners’ pre-tax rate. 
Perhaps this is so, but the conclusion would nonetheless be that the public-
interest theory of regulation failed to predict the outcomes. This case supports 
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Joskow and Noll (1981), that as a theory to describe what actually occurs, the 
public-interest theory is incorrect.  
 
In contrast, the private-interest theory of regulation predicts that the supply of 
regulation will be shaped by the regulated entity’s demand for it. While 
allowing government firms to recover private investor funding costs might be 
consistent with finance theory, the private-interest theory would predict that 
regulators would dismiss the evidence that governments perceived their 
funding costs to be below those of private investors. 
 
While the private-interest theory implicitly assumes the regulation of investor-
owned firms, this study suggests that the theory’s predictions are valid, 
perhaps particularly so when governments as owners of the regulated entity 
create the demand for regulation. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This analysis suggests that compensating government distributors’ financing 
costs at a rate substantially above their actual financing costs, encouraged 
inefficient expansion of the regulated asset base to deliver higher profits. 
Consistent with this, the evidence also suggests that extraordinary profits 
encouraged government owners to attempt to limit the extent of regulatory 
power in order to protect those profits.  
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While finance theory suggests that governments (and regulators) should value 
a government’s cost of capital at private investors’ pre-tax rate, the hypothesis 
in this paper suggests that in Australia they do not. If so, the evidence that 
state governments perceive the cost of their capital as quite different from the 
apparent prescriptions of finance theory is important in the design and 
conduct of economic regulation. 
 
Various solutions are possible. Privatisation would align industry ownership 
with the existing regulatory form. Alternatively, the merits of returning to 
government department oversight of the distributors that the government 
owns, should be explored. This may restore political accountability for prices 
and hence discipline the trade-off between higher profits and the consequent 
political detriment of higher prices. Both of these solutions present political 
disadvantages, but there is evidence that the first has actually worked 
successfully in Australia.  
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Appendix A Outcomes 
Figure 1, based on the on regulators’ expenditure allowances, shows the total 
expenditure per connection that the regulators allow the distributors to charge 
to their customers, in the three regulatory periods (RP) for the government 
distributors in NSW and QLD and the private distributors in SA and VIC3. It 
shows that in all cases over the three periods, allowed expenditure, per 
connection, increased but the increase was much larger for the government 
distributors in NSW and QLD than in SA and VIC.  
                                                     
3 With slight variation of the dates of the regulatory periods amongst the states, RP1 is from 
2000 to 2004, RP2 is from 2005 to 2009 and RP3 is from 2010 to 2014. 
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Figure 1. Total expenditure allowances in three regulatory periods 
 
 
Despite much higher expenditure allowances determined by the regulators, 
the government distributors also substantially overspent these allowances in 
the first two regulatory periods, while the private distributors typically 
underspent particularly in the first and second regulatory periods.   
 
Analysis of the distributors’ expenditure over the period from 2006 to 2013 
covering most of RP2 and RP3 finds that the government distributors spent 
most on substations while the private distributors spent most on poles and 
wires. In all cases, however, network length per connection declined as all 
networks became more dense over the period.  
 
Drawing on information in the Regulatory Information Notices published by the 
Australian Energy Regulator, Figure 2 contrasts the change in substation 
capacity, compared to the change in peak demand, both per connection 
between 2006 and 20134. It shows that all distributors expanded substation 
capacity substantially more than demand, per connection, but more so for the 
government distributors (the first six from the left in the chart). 
Figure 2. Change in substation capacity and peak demand per connection from 
2006 to 2013 
 
                                                     
4 These dates are chosen because the data allowing this analysis is only available from 2006. 
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The difference particularly in capital expenditure between government and 
private distributors resulted in higher growth in the regulated asset value and 
consequently the regulated revenues of the government relative to the private 
distributors. This in turn resulted in higher pecuniary gains for the government 
distributors relative to the private distributors5. A comparison of the owning 
governments’ pecuniary benefits and the regulated asset values and 
regulated revenues of their distributors, per connection, is shown in Figure 3. 
The chart shows that pecuniary benefits more than doubled per connection 
over a period that both regulated revenues and regulated asset values per 
connection increased by around 70%. 
 
Figure 3. Pecuniary benefit, regulated assets per connection and regulated 








                                                     
5 The pecuniary gains for the private distributors are their after-tax profits, while the pecuniary 
gains for the government distributors include their after-tax profits, the income taxes and the 
debt guarantee fees charged by the state government for the loan they made to their 
distributors. 
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